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      We estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese 
market. We find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of 
brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to 
existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The 
price increase was most pronounced among the introducer’s existing brands. 
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I. Introduction 
 
New brands have been an important source of consumer welfare change and firms’ market strategy. In this paper 
we evaluate how new brands have affected the U.S. processed cheese market in terms of consumers’ welfare and 
firms’ profits. During the sample period, from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1992, three processed 
cheese brands entered the markets.   
The introduction of new brands can happen when there is open entry or when incumbents choose to preempt a 
threat of entry by brand proliferation. Incumbents may seek to pack the product characteristics space with a sufficient 
diversity of product variants so that no room for profitable new entry remains.
1 According to Smiley (1988), the 
introduction of new product was one of the most prevalent strategies for deterring entry. Schmalensee (1979) and 
Scherer (1982) also claim that brand proliferation served as an entry deterrent in the RTE cereal industry.
2 
Considering that knowledge of the relationship between dietary fat and heart disease has been spreading rapidly since 
the mid 1980’s,
3 the introduction of low-fat segment brands in the U.S. processed cheese market could have been an 
attempt to fill the related product niches. 
The entry of new brands could affect consumers’ welfare in either of two ways, by increasing the variety of 
brands or by changing the market equilibrium prices. The variety effect would be positive for consumer welfare. 
Since the entrants were low-fat segment brands, consumers whose preferences are in the neighborhood of the product 
characteristics of the entrants in the product space might have benefited more than average consumers. The price 
effect, however, could be positive or negative for consumer welfare depending on the strategy of the introducer and 
other firms’ reactions. The market could have become more competitive following the entry. However, the new 
brands might have given the introducer, Phillip Morris, some control over prices and increased the market prices of 
existing brands. New brands could take producer’s surplus of incumbents. This is called  “cannibalization.”
4 When 
new brands are close substitutes for incumbents, new brands cannibalize considerable surplus from the other brands. 
Since the new brands are low-fat segments, low-fat brands might have lost more than other segments’ brands among 
incumbents.
5 
We proceed as follows.
6 We estimate the processed cheese demand and pricing relationship using a random 
coefficient model at post-entry equilibrium under the assumption of Nash price competition.
7 This is therefore an 
unbalanced panel model that accommodates the entry of new brands. To evaluate the entry effects, we implement a 
counterfactual simulation. Our counterfactual is that new brands are removed from the market. We then estimate a 
new equilibrium price, given consumers’ preferences without the new brands. We evaluate the changes in consumer 
welfare and firms’ margins and profits in 210 markets since the fourth quarter of 1991, the point after which all 
brands were available. 
Our results suggest that the total social welfare increased by 63.5 million dollars in the 2l0 sample markets. The 
consumer surplus was estimated as 43.2 million dollars while total profit change was 20.3 million dollars. The 
consumer welfare increase was attributable mostly to the increase in the number of brands available to consumers. 
The price effect, which measures welfare change from the market with existing brands to the market with the new 
brands added, eroded welfare as the prices of existing brands actually increased facing the new brands in a large 
portion of sample markets. In particular, the increase was most prominent among Phillip Morris’s brands. This 
                                                           
1 Scherer and Ross (1990), p.404. 
2  Scherer and Ross (1990) also describe General Motor’s 1921 decision to offer a complete spectrum of automobiles. And they 
illustrate how the Swedish Tobacco Company reacted by offering twice as many brands upon losing its legal monopoly. 
3 See Pauline M. Ippolito and Alan D. Mathios (1996) 
4 See Scherer and Ross (1990), p.605. 
5 The shares of other low-fat segment cheeses, Lite line, Weight Watchers, and Light N Lively, decreased from 0.79 % to 0.37%, 
from 1.01% to 0.21%, and 0.98% to 0.43%, respectively, during the sample period. 
6 Studies on consumer benefits from new products include Feenstra (1988), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1993), Fershtman and 
Gandal (1998), Petrin (2001), Bresnahan (1986), Greenstein (1994),  
Trajtenberg  (1989), Hausman (1997a, 1997b, 1999). These studies include the automobile, computer, health care, breakfast 
cereal, and cellular phone industries.  
7 Refer to BLP(1995), Nevo (2001) and Petrin (2002) for model specification.  
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verifies that new brands provide a price control for the existing brands of the introducer. 
In Part II, we look into the change in the structure of the U.S processed cheese market and examine data taken 
during the sample period. We then explain the estimation of demand and pricing relationships in Part III. We 
summarize the estimation results in Part IV. And we conclude in Part V.   
 
2. The U.S. Processed Cheese Market and Data 
 
Processed cheese is the largest-selling among all types of cheese and is primarily sold pre-sliced in packages or 
in individually wrapped slices in packages. Table 1 shows the trend in market shares for leading processed cheese 
brands. Phillip Morris has a dominant position in the market and Borden is a distant second to Phillip Morris. 
During the sample period, from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1992, Phillip Morris introduced 
new brands to protect its dominant position. Kraft Free and Velveeta Light were introduced in the first quarter in 1990 
and the first quarter in 1991, respectively. Kraft Light had existed since the first quarter of 1988, but it had been 
available in only a few markets and did not become fully available until the fourth quarter of 1991. These new brands 
helped to recapture market share when their two main brands, Kraft and Velveeta, were losing their market shares. 
The market shares of Kraft and Velveeta were 32.43 % and 25.49 % in the first quarter of 1988, but they shrank to 
23.49 % and 19.40 % by the fourth quarter of 1992, respectively. The combined share of the three low-fat brands was 
8.45% for the fourth quarter of 1992, almost the same as the market share of Borden, which was the second strongest 
firm.    
The data consists of market share, price, product characteristics, and demographic variables.  The data for price 
and quantity was collected from supermarkets in the most populous metropolitan areas of the U.S by Information 
Resources Inc. Market share and price are quarterly, covering the period from the first quarter of 1988 to the fourth 
quarter of 1992. Each city and quarter combination is defined as a market. The total number of markets in the data is 
680. For the analysis, 10 brands are selected, while other brands and private labels are treated as outside goods. Due 
to the entry of new brands, the number of brands varies from seven to 10 in different markets. 
The price is the net of any merchandising activity. Thus, a price reduction for a promotion is reflected in the 
price. And price is deflated using the regional city CPI and then converted to real price per serving (28g). Market 
share is volume share. Product characteristics, calories, fat, sodium, and cholesterol were obtained from nutrient fact 
books that were published during the sample period. Demographic variables are sampled from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS). These include income, age, child, and race. We define the child variable as 1 if the age is less than 17 
years old, 0 otherwise. The nonwhite variable’s value is 1 if an individual is nonwhite and 0 if an individual is white. 




3.1. Demand Specification 
We estimate demand for processed cheese using a random coefficient model.
8 The model represents consumer 
preferences for products as a function of individual consumer characteristics and characteristics of the products.
9 The 
indirect utility of consumer i from brand  j  at market m  depends on product characteristics and consumer: 
) : , , , , ( θ ξ i i jm jm jm ijm v D p x U , where  jm x , jm p  are observed cheese characteristics and prices and  i D , i v  , jm ξ  are 
observed individual characteristics, unobserved individual consumer characteristics, and unobserved cheese 
characteristics,
10 respectively. And θ  is an unknown parameter vector to be estimated. We specify the indirect utility 
function as quasi-linear, following Berry (1994). 
                                                           
8 Refer to BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001). 
9 An alternative approach to solving the dimensionality problem in the differentiated product markets is to use a multi-level 
demand system for differentiated products (Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, 1994, Cotterill, 1994), which is an application of multi-
stage budgeting. 
10 They are observed by consumers but not observed by econometricians. Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                  Kim 
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ijm jm jm i i jm ijm p x u ε ξ α β + + − =                                                       (1) 
 
In the utility function,  i α  represents consumer i ’s marginal income utility,  i β  represents individual-specific 
parameters on product characteristics, and ijm ε  is a mean zero stochastic term, respectively.
11 
The indirect utility can be divided into two parts. The first part is the mean utility level of brand j in the market 
m ,  jm δ , and the second part is the deviation from the mean level utility, which captures the effects of the random 
coefficients. 
 
                ijm i i jm j ijm jm jm j jm ijm D v p x p x u ε θ µ θ ξ δ + + = ) ; , , , ( ) : , , ( 2 1                                 (2) 
 
                                                        jm jm jm jm p x ξ α β δ + − =                                                                    (3)  
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   iom m i i m m i v D u ε σ φ ξ + + + = 0 0 0 0 0                                                    (5) 
 
ijm µ  represents the interaction of price and product characteristics with the observed demographic variables  i D  and 
unobservable individual characteristics  i v . The  i D  is an  1 × L  vector for each individual. The unobserved individual 
characteristics, or  i v ’s, are random draws from the multivariate normal distribution,  1 , 0 ( + K I N ), where  1 + K  draws 
for each individual corresponds to the price and product characteristics of which the dimension is  1 × K . The 
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1
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Additionally,  iom m i i m m i v D u ε σ φ ξ + + + = 0 0 0 0 0  is the indirect utility of the outside goods option.
12 
We assume that consumers choose one unit of the processed cheese brand that offers the highest utility and that 
they choose only one brand during each shopping trip. Let us assume that F is the joint distribution function of  v D,  
and ε . In that case  jm A  represents the set of the values for  v D, and ε  that induces the choice of brand  j  in market 
m . 
                       } ,..., 1 , 0 | , , { J h u u v D A ihm ijm jm = > = ε                                                 (6) 
 
                                                           
11 For the logit model, consumers have the same parameters in the utility function and the individual heterogeneity is modeled in 
the error term only. 
12 We define the total volume of processed cheese sold as market size and we treat the private labels and other small-share brands 
that are not included in the analysis as outside goods. Considering that a cheeseburger costs very little more than a hamburger, an 
increase in the processed cheese price would not make people shift away from consumption of cheeseburgers and consume 
hamburgers instead. Rather, people would substitute private labels or relatively cheaper brands that are not included as inside 
goods. Nevo (2001) assumed the size of the market to be one serving of cereal per capita per day and BLP (1995) use the number 
of automobiles sold as market size. 
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If we assume that v D, and ε  are independent, then the market share of brand j in market m  is as follows. 
 
           ∫∫ = =
jm jm AA jm D dF D v dF v D dF v D dF p x s ) ( ) | ( ) , | ( ) , , ( ) ; , , ( 2 ε ε θ δ                      (7) 
∫ =
jm A D dF v dF dF ) ( ) ( ) (ε  
       
Since the integral is increasingly difficult to calculate as the dimensions of the consumer characteristics increase, 
a simulation estimator of the integral that uses the empirical distribution instead of population density F is used in this 
paper. 
 
 3.2 Pricing Relationship 
Let us assume that each manufacturer f produces goods j=1,…., f J  and that a firm’s marginal cost is constant 
for each product and varies across markets;  jm mc , then a firm’s profit in market m  can be represented as follows
13 
 
                   ∑ = − = Π
f J
j jm jm jm
m
f p Ms mc p
1 ) ( ) (                                                      (8) 
 
M is market size and  jm s (p) is the market share of  j  in market m . With this we can solve the multi-product 
firm’s profit maximization problem under the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition. 
 


















1 ,......., 1 , 0 ) (                                  (9) 
  
When a firm produces many brands, it maximizes the sum of brands’ profits in the firm. The second term 
therefore includes the impact of  jm p  on the other brands’ revenues inside the firm as well as the own price effect on 
its revenue. Hence, the first order conditions, (9), can be summarized in vector notation as (10): 
 
  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = + ∆ − p s p mc p                                                            (10)  
 
where p , mc , and s (p) are a price vector for all brands, a vector of marginal costs of all brands and a vector of 
market shares, and ∆ is a  J J * matrix with elements: 
 








Otherwise    ,   0










We estimate the demand function and then recover the pricing relationship given the estimated demand surface. 
The demand function is estimated by the GMM. An estimation issue in the model is the correlation between prices 
                                                           
13 In this paper we assume that firms solve profit maximization problems in each market separately rather than coordinating 
pricing across markets. Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                  Kim 
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and the error term in the mean utility function. The error term has the interpretation of unobserved product quality.
14 
Hence the estimation requires instrumental variables that are correlated with prices but uncorrelated with the error 
term. To construct the instrumental variables, we followed an approach similar to that of Hausman (1996), Cotterill 
(1994), and Nevo (2001). The identifying assumption is that, controlling for brand-specific means and demographics, 
city-specific demand shocks are independent across cities. Given this assumption, a demand shock for a particular 
brand will be independent of prices of the same brand in other cities. Due to the common marginal cost, prices of a 
brand in different cities within a region will be correlated, and therefore can be used as valid instrument variables.
15 
We include also time dummy fixed effects in the regression model and use them as instruments because the 
independence assumption will be violated if there is a national or regional demand shock or nationwide advertising 
campaign.
16 
Let Z  be n by L matrix with its row k z  and  ) (θ ξ  be n by 1 error term in mean utility with its row  k ξ . Then the 
moment condition, where the instrumental variables are orthogonal to the structural error, or error terms in the mean 
utility, is used to form the GMM objective function,  0 ]   ) ( [ = θ ξk k z E . Then the sample moment will be  
 
Now we search for θ , which minimizes the GMM objective function. The GMM estimate is: 
                                           
                                         ] ' [ min arg θ
^ − −
= m W m
θ
                                                               (12) 
 
Where W  is a consistent estimate of the inverse of asymptotic variance of ). (θ
−
m n  
 
3.4. Estimation of changes in consumer welfare and firms’ profit 
Suppose that the new brands that entered the market during the sample period were removed. There would then 
be only seven processed cheese brands in each market and market prices would converge to new counterfactual 
equilibrium prices, which can be captured by the pricing relationship. As the number of brands changes, the structure 
of  ) (p ∆  will change and market share, ) (p s , will also be different as the probability that consumers will choose any 
particular brand changes. Given the estimated demand side parameters and the technology of brands, we can solve for 
new equilibrium prices using (13) and calculate firms’ new margins and profits.  
 
) ( ) (
1
^
p s p mc p
− ∆ + =                    (13) 
 
 
                                                           
14 The correlation between price and unobserved characteristics is positive because higher quality could lead suppliers to set 
higher prices. Trajtenberg (1989, 1990) found that demand for CT scanners was estimated to be positively sloped with price 
because of the omission of unobserved quality, which was positively correlated with price. 
15 One of the instruments typically used is the variable that represents closeness in product space in the particular markets. The 
examples are BLP (1995) and Bresnahan, Stern, and Trajsenberg (1997). The counts of brands with similar characteristics that are 
sold by competing firms and the same firm provide one example of these instruments. These instruments are, however, 
appropriate for dynamically changing markets in which product characteristics evolve continuously. If a market is mature and 
product characteristics do not change much, then this instrumental variable will not change across markets and it will have little 
identifying power. 
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The total change in producer profits in the sample markets can be calculated as follows.   
 














f mc p mc p θ θ                          (14) 
 
) : , ( 1 θ mc p
m
f Π  is a firm’s profit at the post entry equilibrium price and   ) : , ( 0 θ mc p
m
f Π  is a firm’s profit at 
the conterfactual equilibrium price. As the prices and the number of brands available to consumers change, 
consumers’ welfare also will change. The consumer welfare change is estimated by the compensating variation, 
which is defined as follows: 
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Here,  ) ( 1 p Vij represents  j j i i j ij p x V ξ α β + + =  at equilibrium prices  1 p  with new brands.  ) ( 0 p Vij  is the utility 
level of consumer i who consumes brand j at the counterfactual price  0 p  without new brands. And  i α  is the 
marginal income utility of consumeri.
17 The compensating variation can be divided into two parts, a variety effect 
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The first part of the compensating variation captures the consumer benefit derived from the increase in variety 




Tables 4 and 5 show the estimated demand side parameters.
19  For the parameters of mean utility, the coefficient 
on price is negative and significant and fat is positive and significant.  This is possibly because butterfat increases the 
taste of processed cheese. However, the sensitivity to fat increases as income rises. The interaction term between fat 
and income is negative and significant. The estimates of own and cross price elasticities indicate that cross price 
elasticities between regular segment and low fat segment were asymmetric. Cross price elasticities of low fat segment 
corresponding to price changes of regular segment brands are higher than those of regular segment with respect to the 
price changes in low fat segment. This might have provided an incentive for Phillip Morris to introduce 3 low fat 
segment cheeses to capture consumers who were sensitive to fat and less sensitive to prices. In Table 6 we estimate 
new equilibrium prices without the new brands in each market under the assumption of Nash price competition and 
compare the estimates with current prices. We assume a maximum of seven brands in each market for the 
                                                           
17 We assume that marginal income utility did not change at the pre and post-entry equilibrium. 
18 Hausman and Leonard (2002) also separated the two effects in the different model for the bath tissue market. 
19 The coefficients in the mean utility are recovered from the brand fixed effects using the minimum distance technique. See Nevo 
(2000).  Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                  Kim 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 79  7 
counterfactual prices. Table 6 indicates that market equilibrium prices did not necessarily decrease the following 
entries. For substantial markets, the prices increased for all brands. The increases were more pronounced for the 
introducer of new brands, Phillip Morris. The prices of Kraft, Velveeta, and Light N Lively increased in 141, 125, and 
157 out of 210 markets following the entries. Meanwhile, prices of other firms’ existing brands for the most part 
decreased. Hence the margins of the introducer increased while those of other firms’ brands dropped at the median 
level. This result may suggest that the introducer of new brands, Phillip Morris, responded to market competition by 
packing the market with new brands, thereby reinforcing their market power.  
We can calculate the change in variable profits for each firm by computing implied profits without new brands 
and comparing them to estimated profits with new brands. Producer surplus is computed as the total sum of the profit 
changes as in (14) and it leads to 20.3 million dollars in the 210 sample markets.  
  In the counterfactual, the removal of the new brands leads consumer welfare, which is measured by the 
compensating variation, to decrease, on average,
20 by 0.86 cents per serving for each individual consumer since the 
fourth quarter of 1991.
21 
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where ) (D F  and  ) (v F are the distribution functions of demographic variables and unobserved individual 
characteristics. And total consumer surplus is calculated as average compensating variation per serving times total 
servings. The sum of volume sales of total U.S. Processed cheese brands in the 210 markets is converted to total 
servings with the assumption that each serving is 28g. 
 
   Servings Total CV Average Surplus Consumer Total i × =                                             (18)            
         
The estimated total consumer surplus was 43.2 million dollars in the 210 sample markets. We found that the 
increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands available in the market. 
The variety effect is estimated as 1.12 cents per serving for an average consumer. 
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Meanwhile, the price effect, the welfare change from the seven existing brands, decreased by 0.24 cents per 
serving for an average consumer.
22 
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The welfare loss produced by consuming the existing brands of the introducer contributed principally to the 
result. This is because the introducer raised its prices in a substantial portion of the markets while other firms lowered 
their prices on corresponding brands in the face of competition against the new brands.
23 
                                                           
20 The average was measured by the median. 
21 When we estimate consumer welfare change, we assume that consumers’ welfare from outside goods did not change. 
22 The estimated variety effect and price effect correspond to approximately 8.13 % and –2.03% of retail price per serving, 
respectively. 
23 This indicates an overall trend. Prices of other firms’ brands did not necessarily decrease in all markets. Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                  Kim 
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Meanwhile, the entry of low-fat segment cheese might have affected consumers’ welfare differently, depending 
on consumers’ income levels. The effect of the fat level on a consumer’s utility can be represented as follows, using 
estimated demand side parameters: 
 




* 1490 . 0 * 6675 . 2 5990 . 0 3 − + =
∂
∂
                                                (21) 
 
If we assume that  3 v  is zero on average because  3 v  is a random draw from a mean zero normal distribution,
24 
the FAT effect is negative for high-income consumers, positive for low-income consumers.
25 The entry of low-fat 





In this paper we have estimated the effects of new brands in the processed cheese market on consumers’ utility 
and firms’ margins and profits. We find that new brands have increased consumers’ welfare overall, but the price 
increase of existing brands has eroded that welfare gain somewhat. We also show that the additional brands in the 
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   Kraft(P)  32.43  30.14  23.49 
   Light N Lively(P)  0.98  0.89  0.43 
   Velveeta(P)  25.49  25.03  19.40 
   Kraft Light(P)  0.07  1.23  1.63 
   Kraft Free(P)  -  0.20  3.44 
   Velveeta Light(P)  -  -  3.38 
   Borden(B)  8.78  8.32  8.75 
   Lite Line(B)  0.79  0.72  0.37 
   Land O’Lakes(L)  0.84  0.73  1.18 
  Weight Watchers(H)  1.01  0.48  0.21 
Note: P:Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                  Kim 







Table 2.  Market share, Prices, and Product Characteristics 
 
Market 







Kraft(P)  0.2909  14.197  90  7  25  380 
Velveeta(P)  0.1987  12.230  90  6  25  400 
Light N Lively(P)  0.0088  17.334  70  4  15  406 
Kraft Free(P)  0.0310  16.541  42   0.3  5  273 
Kraft Light (P)  0.0169  15.348  70  4  20  160 
Velveeta Light(P)  0.0224  12.186  60  3  15  430 
Borden(B)  0.0662  12.931  80  6  20  360 
Lite Line(B)  0.0061  19.456  50  2  15  171 
Land O’lakes(L)  0.0064  11.990  110  9  26  430 
Weight Watchers(H)  0.0059  15.376  50  2  7.5  400 
Note: Market share and price are the medians for all city-quarter markets. The unit of price is cents 





Table 3.  Demographic Variables 
  Median  Mean  Std  Min  Max 
Log (Income)  7.835  7.838  0.905  0.405  10.742 
Log (Age)  3.465  3.241  0.940  0  4.564 
Child  0  0.255  0.436  0  1 
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CONTANT  -6.4305 **  0.8255 
PRICE  -6.9269 **  0.9207 
FAT  0.5990 **  0.0825 
SODIUM  -2.1397 **  0.1674 
INCOME  20.6871 **  9.8835 
NONWHITE  -5.9528 **  1.6391 
PRICE*INCOME  -20.0635 **  6.8385 
PRICE*INCOME^2  9.1480 **  3.2117 
PRICE*AGE  -2.1751 *  1.4795 
PRICE*CHILD  2.5205 *  1.3550 
FAT*INCOME  -0.1490 **  0.0419 
CONSTANT* 1 v   0.9280 1.0675 
PRICE* 2 v   1.9152 **  0.6817 
FAT* 3 v   2.6675 *  1.3746 
SODIUM* 4 v   3.0215 *  1.5379 
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Table 5.  Price Elasticities Table  
 
   
Regular 
Segment 
   





















Kraft(P)  -4.705 1.645  0.844  0.236  0.027 0.156  0.198 0.251 0.007 0.034 
Regular Segment 
Velveeta(P)  1.276 -5.853  0.961  0.197  0.033 0.207  0.201 0.482 0.010 0.048 
 
Borden(B)  1.515 1.060  -7.864  0.242  0.030 0.221  0.226 0.350 0.010 0.054 
  Land 
O’Lakes(L)  1.214 1.023  2.217  -8.531  0.049 0.180  0.601 0.434 0.011 0.057 
  Light N 
Lively(P)  0.660 0.521  0.232  0.034  -3.894  0.092  0.067 0.114 0.021 0.020 
 
Kraft free(P)  0.115 0.838  0.410  0.032  0.025  -5.803  0.201 0.303 0.010 0.060 
Low fat segment 
Kraft light(P)  0.604 0.579  0.780  0.190  0.025 0.351  -7.550 0.308 0.012 0.051 
  Velveeta 
light(P)  0.872 0.914  1.002  0.133 0.046  0.426  0.261  -8.321  0.016  0.084 
 
Lite Line(B)  0.148 0.192  0.099  0.010  0.026 0.049 0.028  0.049 -4.994 0.009 
  Weight 
Watchers(H)  0.246 0.666  0.857  0.087 0.043  0.512  0.266  0.464  0.020  -7.216 
Note: Elasticities are median values for all markets;  P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co.  Row is i and column is j. 
Each cell (i, j) gives the percent change in market share of brand i corresponding to a 1 percent change in price of brand j. Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare:  The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                 Kim 


























































(CP )  
Counter-
Factual 
Prices (CFP ) 
P ∆   % 
Change 
# of markets where 
0 > −CFP CP out 
of 210 markets 
Kraft(P) 14.293  13.505 0.791  5.858  141(67%) 
Light N 
Lively(P)  18.285 18.154  0.231  1.272  125(60%) 
Velveeta(P) 12.850  12.293  0.557 4.531  157(75%) 
Borden(B) 12.696  13.121  -0.425  -3.239  33(16%) 
Lite Line(B)  20.047  20.305  -0.258  -1.271  91(43%) 
Land 
O’Lakes(L)  10.756 11.364  -0.608  -5.350  52(25%) 
Weight 
Watchers(H)  14.023 14.430  -0.408  -2.821  34(16%) 
Note: Prices are cents per serving, Medians of 210 markets,  CFP CP P − = ∆ , P: Phillip Morris, 
B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes, H: HJ Heinz Co. Estimation of the effects of new brands on incumbents’ profits and consumer welfare:  The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case                                                 Kim 
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Table 8.  Total Social Welfare Change ($ Millions) 
Total Welfare Change  Total Consumer Surplus  Total Profit change  
63.5  43.2  20.3 





Margins (CFM ) 
∆Margin 
( CFM CM − ) 
Kraft(P) 36.562  34.427  1.548 
Light N Lively(P)  29.718  29.231  0.487 
Velveeta(P) 35.923  34.648  1.275 
Borden(B) 12.853  13.841  -0.988 
Lite Line(B)  13.625  14.412  -0.787 
Land O’Lakes(L)  11.624  12.587  -0.963 
Weight Watchers(H)  11.269  12.534  -1.265 
       Note: Medians of 210 markets, P: Phillip Morris, B: Borden Inc, L: Land O’Lakes,  
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